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How should public health professionals engage with lay 
epidemiology? 
 
Abstract  
 “Lay epidemiology” is a term used to describe the processes through 
which lay individuals understand and interpret health risks.  It is 
seen as a barrier to public health when the public disbelieves or fails 
to act upon public health messages.  We propose that there are two 
elements to lay epidemiology: i) empirical beliefs about the nature of 
illness and ii) values about the place of health and risks to health in a 
good life.  Effective public health must engage with both elements.  
Such engagement would involve attempting to change the public‟s 
empirical beliefs and values.  This is of concern, particularly in a 
context in which the lay voice is increasingly respected.  However, we 
argue that, empirically, the lay voice should defer to the scientific 
voice of standard epidemiology provided there is a clear distinction 
between the measurement of risk, which is empirical, and its 
weighting, which is based on values.  On values, we suggest that 
almost all people view health as an important value.  Furthermore, 
people do discuss and reflect on their values.  Public health 
professionals are, therefore, entitled, indeed advised, to take part in 
that process.  In the final section we defend this view against some 
potential criticisms.   
 
Abstract word count: 199 
 
Key words: Lay epidemiology; epidemiology; public health; ethics. 
 
Full word count: 3286 (ex. References), 3929 (incl. References).  
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How should public health professionals engage with lay 
epidemiology? 
 
Introduction 
This paper presents a new interpretation of, and reflection on, a 
theory that has been widely used in the discussion and development 
of public health policy.  “Lay epidemiology” is a term used to describe 
the processes through which lay individuals understand and interpret 
health risks.  In doing this they use numerous empirical sources, 
such as the observation of cases known to them, newspaper reports 
and television dramas.  Lay epidemiology is seen as a barrier to public 
health in at least two ways.  First, people don‟t always believe health 
messages issued from public health bodies.  Second, people have 
cultural or individual values that undermine health messages: for 
example, health-threatening activities are viewed as “naughty but 
nice”.  To be effective, therefore, public health professionals must 
engage with lay epidemiology.  However, for various reasons one might 
question the right of public health professionals to challenge the 
beliefs and values of individuals and communities.  In this article we 
defend the idea that public health professionals should engage with 
lay epidemiology.  We begin by tracing the emergence and 
development of the concept.   
 
The emergence of lay epidemiology 
The phrase “lay epidemiology” was coined in 19911 in an article that 
described the health beliefs and attitudes found in ethnographic 
research performed in South Wales.  The authors have since 
published several papers in which the concept is used 2 3 4 5 6 and a 
number of other writers have taken it up.7 8 9 10 11  In these articles at 
least two distinct elements seem to make up lay epidemiology.  The 
first is empirical: lay beliefs about the causes, course and 
management of illness.  The second is values: lay beliefs about the 
place of health and risks to health in a good life.  In almost all the 
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articles, lay epidemiology is seen as oppositional to public health in 
one or both of these elements.  However, the articles differ in the way 
they view this opposition.  Let us take each element in turn, starting 
with the empirical. 
 
Empirical element 
The originators of the term emphasise the veridical strength of the 
empirical beliefs in lay epidemiology in opposition to public health 
propaganda.  At the heart of their position is concern about the 
prevention paradox in public health first identified by Rose.12 The 
paradox is that targeting the behaviour of the large majority of the 
population that are at medium or low risk of a particular illness 
related to a behaviour is effective at population level but has little 
effect at individual level.  For example, an individual whose dietary fat 
intake is about average is unlikely to gain from reducing it further; 
nonetheless, were the whole population to reduce their dietary fat 
intake this would have far greater effects on the level of coronary heart 
disease (CHD) than would simply targeting those whose dietary fat 
intake is particularly high.  As a result, Davison et al1 say public 
health professionals have opted for “worthy dishonesty” (p.16): simple 
and untrue messages that exaggerate the risks of particular behaviour 
and the benefits of changing that behaviour.   
 
The problem with such dishonesty, aside from its ethics, is that lay 
epidemiology has cottoned on to the prevention paradox in at least two 
ways.  First, the lay public see the “unwarranted survivals” and 
“anomalous deaths” that run contrary to public health messages.13 
Second, they note the rarity of conditions that are associated by 
public health with common practices, for example, as malignant 
melanoma is associated with sun-tanning.14 Furthermore, the lay 
public has become aware of the fickleness of health messages: for 
example, alcohol is damned and praised almost simultaneously for its 
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health effects.15   As a result, lay epidemiology rightfully “smells a rat” 
with public health messages.   
 
In contrast to this “pro-lay epidemiology” view, others say the task of 
public health professionals is to use information from standard 
epidemiology to correct the lay public‟s misapprehensions.8 13 16  The 
hope is that this correction will lead the public to behave in accord 
with public health messages.  However, people‟s behaviour is a 
product not just of their empirical beliefs, their values are also central.  
Someone will not give up smoking simply because he believes it 
injurious to his health, he must also believe that this risk of injury 
outweighs the pleasure of smoking.  This takes us to the second 
element. 
 
Values 
When weighing up the potential benefits of public health measures, 
public health professionals view the outcomes for population health as 
of primary importance.17  If a change in population behaviour would 
result in a reduction in population illness then it is desirable.  In 
contrast, the lay public takes an “all things considered” view.  As a 
result there are subtle differences in the way behaviour that is deemed 
bad for the health might be seen.  At least three categories of “bad” 
health behaviour may be discerned.18 2   
i) Bad because poisonous.  Such behaviour damages health 
and has little or no obvious pay-off.  Eating foods that 
contain toxins, such as salmonella, is an example.   
ii) Bad but desirable.  Whilst damaging to health, smoking, 
alcohol, illicit drugs, fatty diets and indolence all have 
rewards that may outweigh any health benefits gained from 
avoiding them. 
iii) Bad in some ways, good in others.  As an example, some 
research suggests that people view the health risks of 
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smoking as outweighed by its health benefits such as 
reduction of stress.19 
 
The public is likely to respond positively to messages about poisonous 
behaviour.  Their attitude to messages about the other two types will 
be more ambiguous.  Thus, the all things considered view of lay 
epidemiology might conflict with the health-oriented view of public 
health professionals. 
 
This conflict is seen is in the role of culture in lay epidemiology.  In 
taking an all things considered view, individuals will be affected by 
culture in at least two ways: 
 
i) Some cultures will place a high value on attitudes or 
activities oppositional to public health.  Tod et al 20 21 
examined barriers to the uptake of services for CHD in a 
South Yorkshire working class community.  These barriers 
included the cultural value placed upon independence, 
strength and self-sufficiency.  People put up with symptoms 
of CHD rather than be branded ill and in need of medical 
help.   
 
ii) Much of the public health message is conveyed in terms of 
risk.  However, cultural values will affect how people weigh 
up behaviour as risky or not.  If circumstances outside of 
one‟s control are such that life expectancy (in terms of 
morbidity and morality) is low then this will reduce the 
import of additional risk.  For example, if one is likely to die 
or be miserably ill by the age of 50 22 then smoking will not 
be seen as likely to rob one of much useful life.  Similarly, 
anti-smoking messages will fail in those deprived 
communities where smoking may have a high value in an 
otherwise miserable existence.6 
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We are now in a position to set out the problem that lay epidemiology 
presents for public health. 
 
The problem for public health 
Effective public health measures will inter alia require engagement 
with lay epidemiology.   However, there are reasons to be uneasy 
about doing so, both in terms of empirical beliefs and values.  Again, 
we shall take these in turn. 
 
We have seen the claim that lay epidemiology “smells a rat” in public 
health advice.  In that this suggests that lay epidemiology is 
empirically correct there is no question that public health 
professionals should not seek to challenge it.  Furthermore, we noted 
above that values play an important role in our decisions about 
whether something is of high or low risk.  Epidemiologists cannot 
simply say that, for example, smoking is highly risky to health.  Smith 
23 [p. 498) takes this further: 
 
“This is the way the world is going.  It‟s called 
postmodernism.  There is no „truth‟ defined by experts.  
Rather there are many opinions based on very different 
views and theories of the world.” 
 
Medical knowledge is no longer privileged; rather it is one opinion to 
be weighed amongst others.16 Indeed, the real experts are those with 
the illnesses.  In this climate any attempt by public health 
professionals to correct lay views looks unjustified. 
 
Ex fortiori how can we justify challenging people‟s values if we cannot 
even justify challenging their empirical beliefs? Indeed, given that the 
difference in values between people often reflects cultural differences 
it would be disrespectful to attempt any such change. 
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Thus one might argue that public health professionals should attempt 
to change neither the empirical beliefs nor the values inherent in lay 
epidemiology.  How might public health professionals respond to this 
argument? 
 
Engaging with lay epidemiology’s empirical beliefs 
The term “lay epidemiology” invites a post-modern interpretation.  One 
is tempted to compare it directly with standard epidemiology 
(henceforth simply “epidemiology”).  The thought is that epidemiology 
is at the root of the public health view of health and risk whilst lay 
epidemiology is at the root of the lay view.  Lay epidemiology is, on 
this account, different but equal to epidemiology.   
 
However, it is worth noting in the first place that lay epidemiology 
involves the complete set of empirical beliefs and values relating to 
people‟s behaviour concerning, and attitudes towards, risk.  By 
contrast, epidemiology is purely empirical, the study of the occurrence 
and spread of illness in the population.  As such they are not directly 
comparable.  Furthermore, those who coined the term “lay 
epidemiology” had no post-modern intent.  Their observation was that 
whilst the lay public gathered empirical beliefs about health risk in a 
piecemeal way, many of these beliefs matched those in epidemiology 
and contrasted with the messages given by public health bodies.  
Hence the term “lay epidemiology” was used to emphasise the 
correlation of lay and professional beliefs, not their opposition.  The 
opposition is between both types of epidemiology and public health 
messages that are seen as simplistic or even untrue.  Used in this way 
“lay epidemiology” is at odds with a post-modern view because it relies 
on the idea of truth that post-modernism eschews.   
 
If this is accepted there is no reason to expect lay epidemiology to be 
better than epidemiology at discovering empirical facts.  Epidemiology 
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employs systematic research; lay epidemiology employs partial and 
piecemeal techniques.  As noted above, lay epidemiology will err.  Of 
course, epidemiology itself may err.  This is shown particularly when 
observational epidemiological studies report findings that are 
subsequently not replicated in randomised controlled trials.24 
Nonetheless, epidemiology is less likely to err and more likely to 
correct its own errors.  This gives purchase to the idea that lay 
epidemiology can stand in need of correction in its empirical beliefs.   
 
What, though, of the concern that risk-related terms used in 
epidemiology are not straightforwardly empirical because our values 
determine, for example, what we perceive to be a high risk?  Here we 
should avoid being distracted by the way in which probability facts 
can be presented in a number of different ways.25 All such 
presentations refer to the same fact; as such, this point does not 
support the concern.  Nor should we be distracted by disputes in 
probability theory between, for example, Bayesians and Frequentists.  
Whilst their disputes are important, neither account is consistent with 
a post-modern view.   
 
There remains one serious argument in support of the idea that risk-
related terms are not truly empirical.  This is that our perception of 
risk depends on our circumstances and values.  This argument can be 
tackled by drawing a distinction between the measurement and the 
weighting of risk; in other words, one can distinguish between the 
precise level of risk and whether it is worth worrying about or acting 
upon.  In measurement terms there are ways of presenting risk in a 
fairly precise way.  Many of us are familiar with taxonomies of risk 
presented in drug information sheets listing side effects.  In weighting 
terms, though, whether a risk is worth acting upon will be strongly 
dependent upon values.  Therefore, public health information could 
describe some behaviour as high risk and define this precisely 
provided no weighting conclusions are drawn from this. 
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We conclude, therefore, that a proper account of lay epidemiology 
gives no support to the idea that it represents an alternative to 
epidemiology; neither does it support a post-modern account of truth 
in medicine.  As such, there is no problem in principle with the idea 
that public health professionals can challenge lay epidemiology on 
empirical grounds.  Furthermore, it is possible for public health 
professionals to present epidemiological facts in ways that are true 
and meaningful.  What, though, of the task of challenging the values 
inherent in lay epidemiology? 
 
Engaging with lay epidemiology’s values 
To put this question another way, what should public health bodies 
do if the public, once informed of an avoidable health risk, chooses 
not to avoid it?  One response is to say they should do nothing 
further; the job of public health professionals is to inform the public, 
how they respond is their business.  We shall call this a libertarian 
response.  It has prima facie plausibility.  However, equally plausible 
is the contradictory view that one should sometimes challenge the 
values and attitudes of individuals and communities that leave them 
vulnerable to avoidable illness.  To take a simple example, it seems 
right to challenge the suicidal behaviour of a young person determined 
on self-destruction following disappointment in love.  Here we shall 
develop this idea further. 
 
In this context, values are the views people hold about what is 
worthwhile to do or to have in a good life.  Some of these will be 
instrumentally worthwhile, such as money, others intrinsically, such 
as independence or friendship.  Some will be temporary, such as a 
brief infatuation with Sudoku, others fairly permanent, such as love of 
family.  And all will be weighted as worthwhile to a greater or lesser 
degree.  Values will originate from a mixture of culture, personality, 
experience and reflection.  We have seen already that some working 
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class communities in South Yorkshire place high value on strength 
and independence.26   
 
It is tempting to believe there is no way of judging values and that it is 
wrong to do so; different individuals and cultures have different views 
on what is worthwhile and that‟s that; values are inaccessible to 
reason.  This belief lies at the heart of libertarianism.  However, at 
least two considerations suggest it is flawed. 
 
The first is that values and empirical beliefs interact.  If one believes 
there is little one can do to improve the course of one‟s life then one 
may be more inclined to value immediate over deferred pleasure.  
Changing the empirical belief may change the value in such cases.  
The second is that some values seem widely shared.  One such is 
health: for almost all people, other things being equal, it is better not 
to be ill.  Such widely shared values enable us to have meaningful 
reflection on what constitutes a good life both within and between 
individuals.  Thus someone might decide he is spending too much 
time on Sudoku or work and too little with his family, or that he really 
should lose some weight.  Similarly, close friends might suggest this to 
him in the hope he will see reason.   
 
Hence one may accept that people take an all things considered view 
of what makes certain behaviour worthwhile without necessarily 
accepting that public health professionals should not engage with the 
value-based element underlying such behaviour.  Because health is 
an important and widely shared value, public health professionals are 
entitled to note where people are making sub-optimal health decisions 
and encourage reflection and change.  This view might be challenged 
for at least three reasons. 
 
1) The role of the State. Anyone sympathetic to a libertarian view is 
likely to find it unacceptable for the State to interfere with the 
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values of its citizens; people should make their own decisions 
and live (and die) by them.  However, many States are involved 
in the provision of health care in a way that is inconsistent with 
this view.  If a State provides health care then this weakens 
individual choice, particularly that concerning whether one 
should make one‟s own provision.  But if such State provision is 
acceptable there seems no reason in principle why the State 
might not also be involved in endeavouring to maintain the 
health of citizens. 
 
2) The prevention paradox. We discussed above the argument that 
the prevention paradox lay at the heart of the “worthy 
dishonesty” adopted by public health bodies to which lay 
epidemiology cottoned on.  The implication is that if the public 
were properly informed about public health injunctions they 
would decide not to follow them: for example, from the all things 
considered perspective taken by lay epidemiology it might not 
seem worthwhile to reduce one‟s fat intake if it offers little 
chance of personal benefit.  Davison et al 1 suggest that this 
implication is based on the assumption that individuals will 
only change their behaviour if they anticipate personal benefit, 
an assumption they question.  It might be that people would be 
willing to make behaviour changes for the sake of others, such 
as family or community, rather than themselves.  The 
individual‟s belief here might be, say, that he feels that any 
personal gain is unlikely and certainly not worth the self-
sacrifice involved; however, he might be willing to make that 
sacrifice for the sake of his children.  Nonetheless, if public 
health bodies are unable to persuade people that such changes 
are worthwhile then that should be an end of it.  In practice 
though, as we have suggested, people‟s values are changeable 
and open to reasoned discussion.  Public health bodies are 
Lay epidemiology 
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entitled to take part in that discussion.  There is, however, no 
justification for “worthy dishonesty” even if it were effective.   
 
3) Cultural intolerance.  We saw earlier that some communities 
might have values that run counter to public health aims.  The 
emphasis on strength and independence in one community was 
part of its resistance to the use of services for CHD and resulted 
in avoidable illness.27 Clearly here it would seem undesirable to 
undermine such values simply in order to promote health.  Part 
of the concern is that attempting to change cultural values to 
accord with the aims of public health represents cultural 
intolerance, a desire to homogenise people so they are similar to 
the currently small number of largely middle class people who 
are actively health seeking.28    However, the very existence of 
lay epidemiology might suggest we should not be too worried 
about this.  For example, despite years of public health 
information about smoking, the most deprived communities 
have remained immune to the messages.6 The message that 
public health professionals need to take from this is that it 
needs to be aware of the different cultural contexts in which it 
operates.  In the South Yorkshire communities it must be aware 
provide services in a way that complements the values of that 
community.29 
 
Conclusion 
Lay epidemiology is an apparent problem for public health 
professionals, as it seems to contain a countervailing set of beliefs and 
values.  However, its very existence shows that health is of concern to 
most people.  Furthermore, pace postmodernism, most people will 
want to know and act upon empirical beliefs about health that are 
true.  Epidemiology is far more effective at finding these than is lay 
epidemiology.  As such, public health professionals are right to 
present its findings to the lay public in ways that are meaningful.   
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We have also argued that people‟s values are open to rational 
discussion and that public health professionals are right to take part 
in this; but they must be honest.  They should also be aware of the 
cultural contexts that mean, for example, that something high risk 
and worth avoiding for one person is not the same for another.  
Engaging with lay epidemiology is likely to increase the effectiveness of 
public health work, as well as helping ensure it is ethically sound. 
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